THE MORAL-HAZARD MYTH
The bad idea behind our failed health-care system.
by MALCOLM GLADWELL
The New Yorker,August 29, 2005
Tooth decay begins, typically, when debris becomes trapped between
the teeth and along the ridges and in the grooves of the molars.
The food rots. It becomes colonized with bacteria. The bacteria
feeds off sugars in the mouth and forms an acid that begins to
eat away at the enamel of the teeth. Slowly, the bacteria works
its way through to the dentin, the inner structure, and from there
the cavity begins to blossom three-dimensionally, spreading inward
and sideways. When the decay reaches the pulp tissue, the blood
vessels, and the nerves that serve the tooth, the pain starts—an
insistent throbbing. The tooth turns brown. It begins to lose
its hard structure, to the point where a dentist can reach into
a cavity with a hand instrument and scoop out the decay. At the
base of the tooth, the bacteria mineralizes into tartar, which
begins to irritate the gums. They become puffy and bright red
and start to recede, leaving more and more of the tooth’s
root exposed. When the infection works its way down to the bone,
the structure holding the tooth in begins to collapse altogether.
Several years ago, two Harvard researchers, Susan Starr Sered
and Rushika Fernandopulle, set out to interview people without
health-care coverage for a book they were writing, “Uninsured
in America.” They talked to as many kinds of people as they
could find, collecting stories of untreated depression and struggling
single mothers and chronically injured laborers—and the
most common complaint they heard was about teeth. Gina, a hairdresser
in Idaho, whose husband worked as a freight manager at a chain
store, had “a peculiar mannerism of keeping her mouth closed
even when speaking.” It turned out that she hadn’t
been able to afford dental care for three years, and one of her
front teeth was rotting. Daniel, a construction worker, pulled
out his bad teeth with pliers. Then, there was Loretta, who worked
nights at a university research center in Mississippi, and was
missing most of her teeth. “They’ll break off after
a while, and then you just grab a hold of them, and they work
their way out,” she explained to Sered and Fernandopulle.
“It hurts so bad, because the tooth aches. Then it’s
a relief just to get it out of there. The hole closes up itself
anyway. So it’s so much better.”
People without health insurance have bad teeth because, if you’re
paying for everything out of your own pocket, going to the dentist
for a checkup seems like a luxury. It isn’t, of course.
The loss of teeth makes eating fresh fruits and vegetables difficult,
and a diet heavy in soft, processed foods exacerbates more serious
health problems, like diabetes. The pain of tooth decay leads
many people to use alcohol as a salve. And those struggling to
get ahead in the job market quickly find that the unsightliness
of bad teeth, and the self-consciousness that results, can become
a major barrier. If your teeth are bad, you’re not going
to get a job as a receptionist, say, or a cashier. You’re
going to be put in the back somewhere, far from the public eye.
What Loretta, Gina, and Daniel understand, the two authors tell
us, is that bad teeth have come to be seen as a marker of “poor
parenting, low educational achievement and slow or faulty intellectual
development.” They are an outward marker of caste. “Almost
every time we asked interviewees what their first priority would
be if the president established universal health coverage tomorrow,”
Sered and Fernandopulle write, “the immediate answer was
‘my teeth.’ ”
The U. S. health-care system, according to “Uninsured in
America,” has created a group of people who increasingly
look different from others and suffer in ways that others do not.
The leading cause of personal bankruptcy in the United States
is unpaid medical bills. Half of the uninsured owe money to hospitals,
and a third are being pursued by collection agencies. Children
without health insurance are less likely to receive medical attention
for serious injuries, for recurrent ear infections, or for asthma.
Lung-cancer patients without insurance are less likely to receive
surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation treatment. Heart-attack victims
without health insurance are less likely to receive angioplasty.
People with pneumonia who don’t have health insurance are
less likely to receive X rays or consultations. The death rate
in any given year for someone without health insurance is twenty-five
per cent higher than for someone with insur-ance. Because the
uninsured are sicker than the rest of us, they can’t get
better jobs, and because they can’t get better jobs they
can’t afford health insurance, and because they can’t
afford health insurance they get even sicker. John, the manager
of a bar in Idaho, tells Sered and Fernandopulle that as a result
of various workplace injuries over the years he takes eight ibuprofen,
waits two hours, then takes eight more—and tries to cadge
as much prescription pain medication as he can from friends. “There
are times when I should’ve gone to the doctor, but I couldn’t
afford to go because I don’t have insurance,” he says.
“Like when my back messed up, I should’ve gone. If
I had insurance, I would’ve went, because I know I could
get treatment, but when you can’t afford it you don’t
go. Because the harder the hole you get into in terms of bills,
then you’ll never get out. So you just say, ‘I can
deal with the pain.’ ”One of the great mysteries of
political life in the United States is why Americans are so devoted
to their health-care system. Six times in the past century—during
the First World War, during the Depression, during the Truman
and Johnson Administrations, in the Senate in the nineteen-seventies,
and during the Clinton years—efforts have been made to introduce
some kind of universal health insurance, and each time the efforts
have been rejected. Instead, the United States has opted for a
makeshift system of increasing complexity and dysfunction. Americans
spend $5,267 per capita on health care every year, almost two
and half times the industrialized world’s median of $2,193;
the extra spending comes to hundreds of billions of dollars a
year. What does that extra spending buy us? Americans have fewer
doctors per capita than most Western countries. We go to the doctor
less than people in other Western countries. We get admitted to
the hospital less frequently than people in other Western countries.
We are less satisfied with our health care than our counterparts
in other countries. American life expectancy is lower than the
Western average. Childhood-immunization rates in the United States
are lower than average. Infant-mortality rates are in the nineteenth
percentile of industrialized nations. Doctors here perform more
high-end medical procedures, such as coronary angioplasties, than
in other countries, but most of the wealthier Western countries
have more CT scanners than the United States does, and Switzerland,
Japan, Austria, and Finland all have more MRI machines per capita.
Nor is our system more efficient. The United States spends more
than a thousand dollars per capita per year—or close to
four hundred billion dollars—on health-care-related paperwork
and administration, whereas Canada, for example, spends only about
three hundred dollars per capita. And, of course, every other
country in the industrialized world insures all its citizens;
despite those extra hundreds of billions of dollars we spend each
year, we leave forty-five million people without any insurance.
A country that displays an almost ruthless commitment to efficiency
and performance in every aspect of its economy—a country
that switched to Japanese cars the moment they were more reliable,
and to Chinese T-shirts the moment they were five cents cheaper—has
loyally stuck with a health-care system that leaves its citizenry
pulling out their teeth with pliers.
America’s health-care mess is, in part, simply an accident
of history. The fact that there have been six attempts at universal
health coverage in the last century suggests that there has long
been support for the idea. But politics has always got in the
way. In both Europe and the United States, for example, the push
for health insurance was led, in large part, by organized labor.
But in Europe the unions worked through the political system,
fighting for coverage for all citizens. From the start, health
insurance in Europe was public and universal, and that created
powerful political support for any attempt to expand benefits.
In the United States, by contrast, the unions worked through the
collective-bargaining system and, as a result, could win health
benefits only for their own members. Health insurance here has
always been private and selective, and every attempt to expand
benefits has resulted in a paralyzing political battle over who
would be added to insurance rolls and who ought to pay for those
additions.
Policy is driven by more than politics, however. It is equally
driven by ideas, and in the past few decades a particular idea
has taken hold among prominent American economists which has also
been a powerful impediment to the expansion of health insurance.
The idea is known as “moral hazard.” Health economists
in other Western nations do not share this obsession. Nor do most
Americans. But moral hazard has profoundly shaped the way think
tanks formulate policy and the way experts argue and the way health
insurers structure their plans and the way legislation and regulations
have been written. The health-care mess isn’t merely the
unintentional result of political dysfunction, in other words.
It is also the deliberate consequence of the way in which American
policymakers have come to think about insurance.
“Moral hazard” is the term economists use to describe
the fact that insurance can change the behavior of the person
being insured. If your office gives you and your co-workers all
the free Pepsi you want—if your employer, in effect, offers
universal Pepsi insurance—you’ll drink more Pepsi
than you would have otherwise. If you have a no-deductible fire-insurance
policy, you may be a little less diligent in clearing the brush
away from your house. The savings-and-loan crisis of the nineteen-eighties
was created, in large part, by the fact that the federal government
insured savings deposits of up to a hundred thousand dollars,
and so the newly deregulated S. & L.s made far riskier investments
than they would have otherwise. Insurance can have the paradoxical
effect of producing risky and wasteful behavior. Economists spend
a great deal of time thinking about such moral hazard for good
reason. Insurance is an attempt to make human life safer and more
secure. But, if those efforts can backfire and produce riskier
behavior, providing insurance becomes a much more complicated
and problematic endeavor.
In 1968, the economist Mark Pauly argued that moral hazard played
an enormous role in medicine, and, as John Nyman writes in his
book “The Theory of the Demand for Health Insurance,”
Pauly’s paper has become the “single most influential
article in the health economics literature.” Nyman, an economist
at the University of Minnesota, says that the fear of moral hazard
lies behind the thicket of co-payments and deductibles and utilization
reviews which characterizes the American health-insurance system.
Fear of moral hazard, Nyman writes, also explains “the general
lack of enthusiasm by U.S. health economists for the expansion
of health insurance coverage (for example, national health insurance
or expanded Medicare benefits) in the U.S.”
What Nyman is saying is that when your insurance company requires
that you make a twenty-dollar co-payment for a visit to the doctor,
or when your plan includes an annual five-hundred-dollar or thousand-dollar
deductible, it’s not simply an attempt to get you to pick
up a larger share of your health costs. It is an attempt to make
your use of the health-care system more efficient. Making you
responsible for a share of the costs, the argument runs, will
reduce moral hazard: you’ll no longer grab one of those
free Pepsis when you aren’t really thirsty. That’s
also why Nyman says that the notion of moral hazard is behind
the “lack of enthusiasm” for expansion of health insurance.
If you think of insurance as producing wasteful consumption of
medical services, then the fact that there are forty-five million
Americans without health insurance is no longer an immediate cause
for alarm. After all, it’s not as if the uninsured never
go to the doctor. They spend, on average, $934 a year on medical
care. A moral-hazard theorist would say that they go to the doctor
when they really have to. Those of us with private insurance,
by contrast, consume $2,347 worth of health care a year. If a
lot of that extra $1,413 is waste, then maybe the uninsured person
is the truly efficient consumer of health care.
The moral-hazard argument makes sense, however, only if we consume
health care in the same way that we consume other consumer goods,
and to economists like Nyman this assumption is plainly absurd.
We go to the doctor grudgingly, only because we’re sick.
“Moral hazard is overblown,” the Princeton economist
Uwe Reinhardt says. “You always hear that the demand for
health care is unlimited. This is just not true. People who are
very well insured, who are very rich, do you see them check into
the hospital because it’s free? Do people really like to
go to the doctor? Do they check into the hospital instead of playing
golf?”
For that matter, when you have to pay for your own health care,
does your consumption really become more efficient? In the late
nineteen-seventies, the rand Corporation did an extensive study
on the question, randomly assigning families to health plans with
co-payment levels at zero per cent, twenty-five per cent, fifty
per cent, or ninety-five per cent, up to six thousand dollars.
As you might expect, the more that people were asked to chip in
for their health care the less care they used. The problem was
that they cut back equally on both frivolous care and useful care.
Poor people in the high-deductible group with hypertension, for
instance, didn’t do nearly as good a job of controlling
their blood pressure as those in other groups, resulting in a
ten-per-cent increase in the likelihood of death. As a recent
Commonwealth Fund study concluded, cost sharing is “a blunt
instrument.” Of course it is: how should the average consumer
be expected to know beforehand what care is frivolous and what
care is useful? I just went to the dermatologist to get moles
checked for skin cancer. If I had had to pay a hundred per cent,
or even fifty per cent, of the cost of the visit, I might not
have gone. Would that have been a wise decision? I have no idea.
But if one of those moles really is cancerous, that simple, inexpensive
visit could save the health-care system tens of thousands of dollars
(not to mention saving me a great deal of heartbreak). The focus
on moral hazard suggests that the changes we make in our behavior
when we have insurance are nearly always wasteful. Yet, when it
comes to health care, many of the things we do only because we
have insurance—like getting our moles checked, or getting
our teeth cleaned regularly, or getting a mammogram or engaging
in other routine preventive care—are anything but wasteful
and inefficient. In fact, they are behaviors that could end up
saving the health-care system a good deal of money.
Sered and Fernandopulle tell the story of Steve, a factory worker
from northern Idaho, with a “grotesquelooking left hand—what
looks like a bone sticks out the side.” When he was younger,
he broke his hand. “The doctor wanted to operate on it,”
he recalls. “And because I didn’t have insurance,
well, I was like ‘I ain’t gonna have it operated on.’
The doctor said, ‘Well, I can wrap it for you with an Ace
bandage.’ I said, ‘Ahh, let’s do that, then.’
” Steve uses less health care than he would if he had insurance,
but that’s not because he has defeated the scourge of moral
hazard. It’s because instead of getting a broken bone fixed
he put a bandage on it.At the center of the Bush Administration’s
plan to address the health-insurance mess are Health Savings Accounts,
and Health Savings Accounts are exactly what you would come up
with if you were concerned, above all else, with minimizing moral
hazard. The logic behind them was laid out in the 2004 Economic
Report of the President. Americans, the report argues, have too
much health insurance: typical plans cover things that they shouldn’t,
creating the problem of overconsumption. Several paragraphs are
then devoted to explaining the theory of moral hazard. The report
turns to the subject of the uninsured, concluding that they fall
into several groups. Some are foreigners who may be covered by
their countries of origin. Some are people who could be covered
by Medicaid but aren’t or aren’t admitting that they
are. Finally, a large number “remain uninsured as a matter
of choice.” The report continues, “Researchers believe
that as many as one-quarter of those without health insurance
had coverage available through an employer but declined the coverage.
. . . Still others may remain uninsured because they are young
and healthy and do not see the need for insurance.” In other
words, those with health insurance are overinsured and their behavior
is distorted by moral hazard. Those without health insurance use
their own money to make decisions about insurance based on an
assessment of their needs. The insured are wasteful. The uninsured
are prudent. So what’s the solution? Make the insured a
little bit more like the uninsured.
Under the Health Savings Accounts system, consumers are asked
to pay for routine health care with their own money—several
thousand dollars of which can be put into a tax-free account.
To handle their catastrophic expenses, they then purchase a basic
health-insurance package with, say, a thousand-dollar annual deductible.
As President Bush explained recently, “Health Savings Accounts
all aim at empowering people to make decisions for themselves,
owning their own health-care plan, and at the same time bringing
some demand control into the cost of health care.”
The country described in the President’s report is a very
different place from the country described in “Uninsured
in America.” Sered and Fernandopulle look at the billions
we spend on medical care and wonder why Americans have so little
insurance. The President’s report considers the same situation
and worries that we have too much. Sered and Fernandopulle see
the lack of insurance as a problem of poverty; a third of the
uninsured, after all, have incomes below the federal poverty line.
In the section on the uninsured in the President’s report,
the word “poverty” is never used. In the Administration’s
view, people are offered insurance but “decline the coverage”
as “a matter of choice.” The uninsured in Sered and
Fernandopulle’s book decline coverage, but only because
they can’t afford it. Gina, for instance, works for a beauty
salon that offers her a bare-bones health-insurance plan with
a thousand-dollar deductible for two hundred dollars a month.
What’s her total income? Nine hundred dollars a month. She
could “choose” to accept health insurance, but only
if she chose to stop buying food or paying the rent.
The biggest difference between the two accounts, though, has to
do with how each views the function of insurance. Gina, Steve,
and Loretta are ill, and need insurance to cover the costs of
getting better. In their eyes, insurance is meant to help equalize
financial risk between the healthy and the sick. In the insurance
business, this model of coverage is known as “social insurance,”
and historically it was the way health coverage was conceived.
If you were sixty and had heart disease and diabetes, you didn’t
pay substantially more for coverage than a perfectly healthy twenty-five-year-old.
Under social insurance, the twenty-five-year-old agrees to pay
thousands of dollars in premiums even though he didn’t go
to the doctor at all in the previous year, because he wants to
make sure that someone else will subsidize his health care if
he ever comes down with heart disease or diabetes. Canada and
Germany and Japan and all the other industrialized nations with
universal health care follow the social-insurance model. Medicare,
too, is based on the social-insurance model, and, when Americans
with Medicare report themselves to be happier with virtually every
aspect of their insurance coverage than people with private insurance
(as they do, repeatedly and overwhelmingly), they are referring
to the social aspect of their insurance. They aren’t getting
better care. But they are getting something just as valuable:
the security of being insulated against the financial shock of
serious illness.
There is another way to organize insurance, however, and that
is to make it actuarial. Car insurance, for instance, is actuarial.
How much you pay is in large part a function of your individual
situation and history: someone who drives a sports car and has
received twenty speeding tickets in the past two years pays a
much higher annual premium than a soccer mom with a minivan. In
recent years, the private insurance industry in the United States
has been moving toward the actuarial model, with profound consequences.
The triumph of the actuarial model over the social-insurance model
is the reason that companies unlucky enough to employ older, high-cost
employees—like United Airlines—have run into such
financial difficulty. It’s the reason that automakers are
increasingly moving their operations to Canada. It’s the
reason that small businesses that have one or two employees with
serious illnesses suddenly face unmanageably high health-insurance
premiums, and it’s the reason that, in many states, people
suffering from a potentially high-cost medical condition can’t
get anyone to insure them at all.
Health Savings Accounts represent the final, irrevocable step
in the actuarial direction. If you are preoccupied with moral
hazard, then you want people to pay for care with their own money,
and, when you do that, the sick inevitably end up paying more
than the healthy. And when you make people choose an insurance
plan that fits their individual needs, those with significant
medical problems will choose expensive health plans that cover
lots of things, while those with few health problems will choose
cheaper, bare-bones plans. The more expensive the comprehensive
plans become, and the less expensive the bare-bones plans become,
the more the very sick will cluster together at one end of the
insurance spectrum, and the more the well will cluster together
at the low-cost end. The days when the healthy twenty-five-year-old
subsidizes the sixty-year-old with heart disease or diabetes are
coming to an end. “The main effect of putting more of it
on the consumer is to reduce the social redistributive element
of insurance,” the Stanford economist Victor Fuchs says.
Health Savings Accounts are not a variant of universal health
care. In their governing assumptions, they are the antithesis
of universal health care.
The issue about what to do with the health-care system is sometimes
presented as a technical argument about the merits of one kind
of coverage over another or as an ideological argument about socialized
versus private medicine. It is, instead, about a few very simple
questions. Do you think that this kind of redistribution of risk
is a good idea? Do you think that people whose genes predispose
them to depression or cancer, or whose poverty complicates asthma
or diabetes, or who get hit by a drunk driver, or who have to
keep their mouths closed because their teeth are rotting ought
to bear a greater share of the costs of their health care than
those of us who are lucky enough to escape such misfortunes? In
the rest of the industrialized world, it is assumed that the more
equally and widely the burdens of illness are shared, the better
off the population as a whole is likely to be. The reason the
United States has forty-five million people without coverage is
that its health-care policy is in the hands of people who disagree,
and who regard health insurance not as the solution but as the
problem.
Other articles by Malcolm Gladwell are available
at www.gladwell.com.
One Nation,
Uninsured
By PAUL KRUGMAN
New York Times, June 13, 2005
Harry Truman tried to create a national health insurance system.
Public opinion was initially on his side: Jill Quadagno's book
"One Nation, Uninsured" tells us that in 1945, 75 percent
of Americans favored national health insurance. If Truman had
succeeded, universal coverage for everyone, not just the elderly,
would today be an accepted part of the social contract.
But Truman failed. Special interests,
especially the American Medical Association and Southern politicians
who feared that national insurance would lead to racially integrated
hospitals, triumphed. Sixty years later, the patchwork system
that evolved in the absence of national health insurance is unraveling.
The cost of health care is exploding, the number of uninsured
is growing, and corporations that still provide employee coverage
are groaning under the strain. So the time will soon be ripe for
another try at universal coverage. Public opinion is already favorable:
a 2003 Pew poll found that 72 percent of Americans favored government-guaranteed
health insurance for all.
But special interests will, once again,
stand in the way. And the big debate among would-be reformers
is how to deal with those interests, especially the insurance
companies. These companies played a secondary role in Truman's
failure but have since become a seemingly invincible lobby. Let's
ignore those who believe that private medical accounts - basically
tax shelters for the healthy and wealthy - can solve our health
care problems through the magic of the marketplace. The intellectually
serious debate is between those who believe that the government
should simply provide basic health insurance for everyone and
those proposing a more complex, indirect approach that preserves
a central role for private health insurance companies.
A system in which the government provides
universal health insurance is often referred to as "single
payer," but I like Ted Kennedy's slogan "Medicare for
all." It reminds voters that America already has a highly
successful, popular single-payer program, albeit only for the
elderly. It shows that we're talking about government insurance,
not government-provided health care. And it makes it clear that
like Medicare (but unlike Canada's system), a U.S. national health
insurance system would allow individuals with the means and inclination
to buy their own medical care.
The great advantage of universal, government-provided
health insurance is lower costs. Canada's government-run insurance
system has much less bureaucracy and much lower administrative
costs than our largely private system. Medicare has much lower
administrative costs than private insurance. The reason is that
single-payer systems don't devote large resources to screening
out high-risk clients or charging them higher fees. The savings
from a single-payer system would probably exceed $200 billion
a year, far more than the cost of covering all of those now uninsured.
Nonetheless, most reform proposals
out there - even proposals from liberal groups like the Century
Foundation and the Center for American Progress - reject a simple
single-payer approach. Instead, they call for some combination
of mandates and subsidies to help everyone buy insurance from
private insurers.
Some people, not all of them right-wingers,
fear that a single-payer system would hurt innovation. But the
main reason these proposals give private insurers a big role is
the belief that the insurers must be appeased. That belief is
rooted in recent history. Bill Clinton's health care plan failed
in large part because of a dishonest but devastating lobbying
and advertising campaign financed by the health insurance industry
- remember Harry and Louise? And the lesson many people took from
that defeat is that any future health care proposal must buy off
the insurance lobby.
But I think that's the wrong lesson.
The Clinton plan actually preserved a big role for private insurers;
the industry attacked it all the same. And the plan's complexity,
which was largely a result of attempts to placate interest groups,
made it hard to sell to the public. So I would argue that good
economics is also good politics: reformers will do best with a
straightforward single-payer plan, which offers maximum savings
and, unlike the Clinton plan, can easily be explained.
We need to do this one right. If reform
fails again, we'll be on the way to a radically unequal society,
in which all but the most affluent Americans face the constant
risk of financial ruin and even premature death because they can't
pay their medical bills.
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com
An Urgent Case
For Fixing Health Care
By David S. Broder
Washington Post
Sunday, May 29, 2005
Nothing is more likely to be overlooked
than news that breaks on a day when something totally unexpected
occurs. That is exactly what happened last week when Senate negotiators
struck the last-minute deal that averted a showdown vote over
the "nuclear option" on judicial filibusters.
Earlier that day, the National Coalition on Health Care released
a report on the potential savings to business, individuals and
government from comprehensive reform of the beleaguered medical-insurance-hospital
system.
The figures are startling -- a projected saving of anywhere from
$320 billion to $1.1 trillion in the first 10 years, even while
insurance coverage is extended to every American and stronger
quality measures are put in place.
Were it not for its source, this would seem like pie in the sky.
But the organization that sponsored the briefing is one of the
largest groups in the health care field, a coalition of 90 organizations
with 150 million members or employees, ranging from AARP and the
AFL-CIO to Blue Shield of California and such corporate giants
as AT&T, Verizon and the Principal Financial Group.
The man who ran the numbers is Kenneth Thorpe, the former top
economist at the Department of Health and Human Services and now
chairman of the Health Policy and Management Department of Emory
University in Atlanta. Few experts command broader respect in
this field.
Thorpe took the principles laid down in the coalition's blueprint
for health reform -- universal coverage, cost management and improved
quality -- and applied them to four "scenarios."
One built on the existing employer-financed system, supplemented
by requirements for individuals to self-insure. A second envisaged
expansion of Medicare, Medicaid and other public programs. A third
was a new program, with a variety of insurance options modeled
on the current federal employees' health benefits plan. And the
fourth was a single-payer, government-financed design, similar
to Canada's or Britain's.
The additional costs -- primarily caused by covering the 45 million
Americans currently without health insurance -- run in the range
of $75 billion a year. But the net savings -- after deducting
those costs -- by the 10th year of such reforms range from $125
billion to $182 billion annually.
When everyone is insured, health problems can be dealt with at
an early stage or prevented altogether, thus helping society avoid
the expensive treatment that patients now find in emergency rooms
or lengthy hospital stays. Universal coverage also can bring savings
in administrative costs and, along with the introduction of information
technology and systematic measurements of treatment outcomes,
greatly increase the efficiency of health care delivery.
Underlining the advantage of systemic reform are Thorpe's calculations
of the likely consequences of doing nothing to change the current
system. Without fundamental change, by 2015, the United States
is likely to have 54 million uninsured -- 20 percent more than
today -- and be spending 19 percent of its gross domestic product
on health care, compared with 15.6 percent today.
Testimony from two top executives showed that this is not just
an academic exercise. George Diehr, chairman of health benefits
of the California Public Employees' Retirement System (Calpers),
whose $4 billion annual expenditure makes it the third-largest
purchaser of health care in the nation, said that despite its
bargaining power "we have been able to improve quality and
control costs only at the margin." Its costs are rising 10
percent a year.
S. Gary Snodgrass, executive vice president of Exelon Corp., one
of the country's largest public utilities, said health coverage
for its employees and retirees is its fastest-growing expense.
Between 2001 and 2004, he said, those costs rose 70 percent, forcing
the company to shift more of the burden to its workers. "What
I am here to tell you is that the steps we have taken are not
enough" to fix "a health care delivery system that we
perceive to be fundamentally broken. It will not be fixed by the
incremental or piecemeal proposals that are on the table today"
in Congress or the Bush administration.
More and more business leaders, academics and politicians are
coming to the same conclusion. The Center for American Progress,
a liberal think tank headed by former Clinton White House chief
of staff John Podesta, recently outlined one approach to comprehensive
health care reform. It would combine two of the scenarios tested
in Thorpe's analysis, with subsidies and cost controls for insurance
policies purchased by employers and individuals and an expansion
of the federal employees' health care system to enroll outsiders.
When I interviewed Podesta recently, I told him that I thought
that any such systemic reform would have to wait for a new administration.
But Thorpe's calculations, which I had not seen at that time,
make the case for action now both more urgent and more practical.
Op-Ed Contributor
Decoding Health Insurance.By ROBIN COOK Published: May 22, 2005
Boston
NEARLY five years ago, President Bill
Clinton had an all-star gathering at the White House to announce
the completion of the first draft of the human genome's approximately
3.2 billion base pairs. Speaking to an audience that included
eminent scientists like Dr. James Watson, who helped discover
DNA, Mr. Clinton pronounced that "today we are learning the
language in which God created life." Prime Minister Tony
Blair of Britain chimed in via satellite, "For most of us,
today's developments are too awesome to comprehend."
Turns out that Mr. Blair was right,
although not quite in the way that he intended. Despite the high-flying
talk and the abundant news media coverage of the announcement,
the public greeted the event with vague interest, a touch of bewilderment,
varying degrees of ennui - and then quickly forgot about it. This
general indifference to one of science's landmark achievements
has persisted even as the science and technology involved have
yielded some remarkable discoveries. We now know, for example,
that a vast majority of our genome is composed of repetitive nonsense
sequences, and that instead of humans having the 100,000-plus
genes previously predicted, we have somewhere in the neighborhood
of 25,000, many of which we share with all other living things,
a fact that anchors us firmly in the process of evolution (whether
a creative intelligence was involved or not).
Of course, people can perhaps be forgiven
for not wanting to recognize that they don't have many more genes
than round worms or fruit flies - a blow to humanity's ego that's
about as powerful as Copernicus's discovery that the earth revolved
around the sun instead of vice versa.
As a doctor schooled to some degree
in science, I believed (and still do) that decoding the human
genome might be the most important milestone in the history of
medical science. To borrow Mr. Clinton's metaphor, the full genome
offers researchers the sequence of all the letters of the human
book of life, a monumental resource despite our imperfect understanding
of the book's overarching, mind-boggling complexity. As decoding
gathers speed, it promises to change just about everything we
know about medicine in the form of understanding, prediction,
prevention, diagnosis and the treatment of disease. And in so
doing, it also offers us a remarkable opportunity to solve the
huge and nettlesome problem of paying for health care in the United
States.
Public skepticism of such grandiose
statements is understandable. After all, you might say: "Where
are all the touted breakthroughs, the miracle drugs and diagnostic
tests, predicted five years ago? Finding out that humans have
about the same number and some of the same genes as a worm may
be interesting to somebody, but it's hardly a health care revolution,
much less worth the more than $3 billion that have so far been
spent on decoding."
Well, the drugs are not here yet, although
they are on the horizon. But that doesn't diminish the broader
fact that the rapidly developing fields of genomics and bioinformatics
hold enormous promise. In simple terms, genomics is the study
of the flow of information in a cell orchestrated by the genome,
while bioinformatics is the application of computers to make sense
of the enormous amount of data coming from genomics.
Knowledge of the genome has greatly
improved our ability to predict an individual's predilection for
a host of diseases. Thousands upon thousands of markers have been
identified throughout the genome and linked to particular mutated,
deleterious genes associated with specific medical problems. The
presence of these markers can be determined by placing a single
drop of blood onto a particular type of slide called a microarray.
Microarrays, in turn, are read automatically by laser scanners
and the results, thanks to bioinformatics, can be analyzed instantly
by computers armed with appropriate software and statistical data.
The importance of a rapid increase
in prognostic ability is underlined by the growing understanding
that every disease has a greater or lesser genetic component.
Patients can now avail themselves of preventive measures or treatment
even before symptoms occur. But there is a down side. First of
all, we can predict more and more diseases that are associated
with progressive disability and death and which have, as of yet,
no treatment. Finding a marker linked to such an illness is thus
the cruel equivalent of an extended death sentence. Understandably
many people would not want such a test and would hardly classify
having one as a positive health care breakthrough.
Another, and possibly more important,
negative consequence of this new ability to predict illness is
the potential for discrimination in one form or another if confidential
health information is released. Unfortunately the chances of such
a breach of privacy occurring, despite lip service by politicians
to prevent it legislatively, are probably inevitable. Not only
is microarray technology easily accessible, but for-profit private
insurance companies have strong incentives to use it to protect
their bottom lines by denying service, claims or even coverage.
Forum: Op-Ed Contributors
It is precisely this danger, however, that may lead to a great
breakthrough: the inevitable movement to universal health care.
In this dawning era of genomic medicine, the result may be that
the concept of private health insurance, which is based on actuarially
pooling risk within specified, fragmented groups, will become
obsolete since risk cannot be pooled if it can be determined for
individual policyholders. Genetically determined predilection
for disease will become the modern equivalent of the "pre-existing
condition" that private insurers have stringently avoided.
As a doctor I have always been against
health insurance except for catastrophic care and for the very
poor. It has been my experience that the doctor-patient relationship
is the most personal and rewarding for both the patient and the
doctor when a clear, direct fiduciary relationship exists. In
such a circumstance, both individuals value the encounter more,
which invariably leads to more time, more attention to potentially
important details, and a higher level of patient compliance and
satisfaction - all of which invariably result in a better outcome.
But with the end of pooling risk within
defined groups, there is only one solution to the problem of paying
for health care in the United States: to pool risk for the entire
nation. (Under the rubric of health care I mean a comprehensive
package that includes preventive care, acute care and catastrophic
care.) Although I never thought I'd advocate a
government-sponsored, obviously non-profit, tax-supported, universal
access, single-payer plan, I've changed my mind: the sooner we
move to such a system, the better off we will be. Only with universal
health care will we
be able to pool risk for the entire country and share what nature
has dealt us; only then will there be no motivation for anyone
or any organization to ferret out an individual's confidential,
genetic makeup.
There are plenty of compelling arguments
for a national, single-payer, universal access plan - like every
developed industrialized country has one. But those arguments
have so far seemed insufficient. And none of them is nearly as
cogent and persuasive as the growing impact of genomics and bioinformatics.
Of course, far too many wealthy stakeholders in the current system
(thanks to 15 percent of our gross domestic product being thrown
at health care) are eager to lobby members of Congress to keep
things as they are. The basic challenge is to blast the public
and their elected representatives out of their shared apathy toward
what the decipherment of the human genome has brought.
The day after the White House ceremony
in 2000, one letter-writer to this newspaper expressed the wish
that the United States would devote the same amount of enthusiasm
and resources that it had expended on the human genome
project toward the goal of "assuring access to basic medical
care for all Americans." If the money spent on the genome
ends up achieving that health care goal, that wish may yet come
true.
Robin Cook is a medical doctor and
the author, most recently, of the novel
"Marker."
Your Money
or Your Life
by DAN FROSCH
[from the February 21, 2005 issue] THE NATION
Five long years ago, Rose Shaffer's
life seemed sweet. A nurse since the early 1970s, Shaffer had
spent most of her sixty years working at various Chicago hospitals,
rising through the caregiver ranks and raising three kids. Now
in the twilight of her career, she'd been hired as director of
nursing at a home health agency in the suburb of Lombard. The
position made Shaffer proud--she knew her salary could pay off
the mortgage on her house a little sooner. At the time, her cousin
Barack Obama was fast becoming a rising star in the Illinois State
Senate.
Seven months into her new job, Shaffer suffered a heart attack,
and an ambulance rushed her to Advocate South Suburban Hospital.
Shaffer assumed she was automatically covered--health insurance
was a given at her previous nursing jobs. She thought she'd filled
out the proper forms. But she hadn't.
A week later, Shaffer received a bill from Advocate for the three
days she'd been hospitalized. It was for $18,000. Shortly thereafter,
Advocate began sending letters to Shaffer demanding payment. Then,
a summons to appear in court was tossed on her porch. Advocate
was suing her.
Shaffer was terrified and didn't show at her court date. She says
she even received a letter from the Cook County Sheriff's Department,
threatening arrest unless she appeared. Under pressure from Advocate
and now behind on her mortgage payments, Shaffer filed for Chapter
13 bankruptcy in December 2002, which meant her debtors would
garner a reduced portion of the money she owed.
"The hospital saved my life, but now they were trying to
kill me," Shaffer says.
Rose Shaffer's experience has become disquietingly common. Since
2000, Harvard associate medical professors Steffie Woolhandler
and David Himmelstein, along with Harvard law professor Elizabeth
Warren and Ohio University sociology and anthropology professor
Deborah Thorne, have been compiling data on bankruptcies in the
United States. Their study, published on February 2 by the medical
policy journal Health Affairs, found that between 1981 and 2001,
medical-related bankruptcies increased by 2,200 percent, an astonishing
explosion in a relatively short period of time. This spike far
outpaced the 360 percent growth in all personal bankruptcies during
roughly the same period.
In addition, the study uncovered surprising information about
the affected population. While poor, uninsured Americans have
long been the most obvious victims of a defective healthcare system,
it's the middle class that suffers most in this case, accounting
for about 90 percent of all medical bankruptcies, says Warren.
"The people we found to be profoundly affected are not some
distant underclass. They're the very heart of the middle class,"
Warren says. "These are educated Americans with decent jobs,
homes and families. But one stumble, and they end up in complete
financial collapse, wiped out by medical bills."
With so many middle-class American households potentially vulnerable,
you might think politicians would seek a solution sensitive to
their interests. Yet the momentum in Washington is in the opposite
direction--toward bankruptcy "reform" that would make
things worse for people who have been financially ruined by illness.
Until twenty-five years ago, filing for bankruptcy because of
debts from a medical problem was virtually unheard of. In 1981,
University of Texas law professors conducting bankruptcy research
noticed that a handful of the debtors they were studying could
never quite pay off their medical bills, but while these bills
certainly didn't help, they weren't forcing people into bankruptcy.
Today, by contrast, medical-related debt is the second leading
cause of personal bankruptcies, topped only by job loss. Edward
Janger, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, gives two reasons
for the change: First, there's been a dramatic rise in healthcare
costs. In 2002 Americans paid an average of $5,440 in medical
expenditures, up $419 from the previous year. A September 2004
study by Families USA found that 14.3 million Americans now hemorrhage
more than a quarter of their earnings into healthcare costs.
Second, the past fifteen years have seen a tremendous spike in
the number of Americans who either don't have health insurance
or have such skeletal coverage they might as well have none--there
are currently some 45 million uninsured Americans, a jump of 10
million since 1990.
"What you're seeing in the bankruptcy numbers is a function
of the fact that we have a very thin social safety net in this
country in terms of health care," Janger says.
The Health Affairs study, which looked specifically at a cross
section of 1,771 bankruptcies filed in 2001, concluded that the
average medical debtor was a 41-year-old homeowning woman, with
children and at least some education. The study also found that
a majority of middle-class debtors had health insurance both when
they first grew sick and at the actual time they filed, another
surprise. Insurance alone, it turns out, doesn't prevent medical
bankruptcy, because it is often too porous to provide a real buffer
against the financial burden of a serious illness.
"A lot of people were bankrupted because of co-payments,
deductibles or uncovered services, which added up to thousands
of dollars in bills," says Steffie Woolhandler.
The story of Judy and Phil Specht shows how quickly livelihoods
and bank accounts can collapse in the shadow of an illness, even
when people initially have health insurance. It also demonstrates
how medical problems, when coupled with job loss, can be particularly
devastating--many debtors grappled with medical debt and income
loss simultaneously, according to the Health Affairs study.
In 2001 the Spechts were living comfortably in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, having worked at solid jobs there for years--Judy at a
Philips semiconductor factory and Phil as a maintenance man at
a retirement community. Together, the Spechts were bringing in
around $40,000, which in New Mexico was enough to make the $787
monthly mortgage payment on their new home and still have a little
left. Lately, Phil hadn't been feeling great--his body ached more
than usual--but the Spechts both had health coverage through their
jobs. In their late 50s, they were near enough retirement to taste
it.
By 2002, though, Phil had grown worse, and after a series of tests,
doctors diagnosed myelodysplastic syndrome, a bone-marrow disease
that can cause leukemia. Phil retired and began collecting $1,080
a month in Social Security disability payments.
"I still had a good paying job with insurance that could
cover us both, so I thought we'd be OK," Judy says.
But when Philips started shuttering some of its New Mexico factories
three months later, Judy was laid off. She quickly found a job
working at another semiconductor company, but after five months
she was axed again. Now desperate, Judy took a housecleaning job
at near-minimum wage. It was all she could find.
Fortunately, the Spechts only paid $50 a month for Phil's visits
to University of New Mexico Hospital oncologists, thanks to UNM's
charity care. But they had trouble affording the regular blood
work Phil needed and the monthly $507 in prescription drug payments
for both of them, climbing quickly because Judy developed high
blood pressure, high cholesterol, acid reflux and an underactive
thyroid--"stuff I hadn't experienced before this."
To save money, Judy chopped her blood pressure and thyroid tablets
in half, took the acid-reflux medication less often than prescribed
and quit her cholesterol pills altogether. "I was left with
a choice of my medication or a roof over our heads."
To afford Phil's medicine, the Spechts sold their furniture, some
jewelry and a camera. But by the end of 2003, $4,000 deep in medical
debt and with $90,000 still left on their mortgage, the Spechts
knew they couldn't hold on to their house any longer.
They hired a bankruptcy lawyer and filed for Chapter 7, freeing
them from debt but eviscerating their credit for seven to ten
years. The bank foreclosed on their mortgage, and the Spechts
moved twice before settling in a cheap apartment for people over
55. Although they now participate in a new state program that
offers drug discounts to elderly New Mexicans, the Spechts still
owe $1,000 in medical bills; even after filing for bankruptcy,
the couple continued to rack up bills until Judy finally landed
a state job that gave her health coverage. The stress of the past
three years has changed the Spechts forever. Judy describes the
whole process as "frightening and humiliating."
"We'd wanted to retire in that house. We were heartbroken,"
she says.
The nightmare lived by the Spechts and other Americans could become
even more harrowing if some members of Congress have their way.
For years now, a powerful coalition of banks and credit-card companies
has been lobbying Congress to make it harder to file for Chapter
7 bankruptcy, which cancels personal debt, in favor of Chapter
13, which involves paying back a portion over a period of time.
As the number of personal bankruptcies has surged--from approximately
718,000 in 1990 to 1.54 million in 2004--banks and credit-card
companies say, they've lost billions of dollars in canceled payments.
Republicans, and some Democrats, have long been pushing a bill
that would create a means test for debtors who want to file for
bankruptcy, preventing anyone who makes over the median income
in their home state from filing for Chapter 7, but allowing them
to file for Chapter 13. The idea, proponents say, is to make debtors
take better care of their money.
Although the bill has failed in years past, Iowa's GOP Senator
Chuck Grassley, buoyed by Republican Congressional gains and past
support from moderate Democrats like minority leader Harry Reid,
recently reintroduced the legislation. "People who have the
ability to repay some or all of their debt should not be able
to use bankruptcy as a financial planning tool so they get out
of paying their debt scot-free while honest Americans who play
by the rules have to foot the bill," says Grassley's spokesperson
Jill Kozeny. Kozeny also notes that medical expenses would be
deductible under the means test, and that adjustments to the test
would be allowed if debtors show "special circumstances."
Jim Manley, Reid's communications director, says Reid will support
the legislation, which he believes will force people to "take
a measure of personal responsibility" for their financial
affairs. Reid and some other Democrats will insist that it contain
a provision preventing abortion clinic protesters from filing
for bankruptcy to avoid paying legal fines (a practice that Reid,
who is antichoice, nonetheless opposes). Such a provision was
added to the 2002 version of the bill in an attempt to give political
cover to Democrats (including Senators Chuck Schumer and Hillary
Clinton) who voted for it.
The legislation has nonetheless elicited some principled and vigorous
Democratic opposition, from John Kerry, Jon Corzine, Dick Durbin
and Ted Kennedy, among others. The bill's critics argue that it
will squeeze the lower middle class right out of the system. This
demographic, they say, might still earn above their state's median
income, deductions notwithstanding, yet may not be able to afford
to hire an attorney to prove through litigation that their story
is exceptional.
Moreover, says Elizabeth Warren, there's a good chance many middle-class
debtors wouldn't even be able to make Chapter 13 repayments. Nearly
two-thirds of those who file for Chapter 13 aren't able to pay
up, leaving them vulnerable to creditors for years, she notes.
"The catastrophic problems which cause families to file for
bankruptcy are not properly addressed by imposing greater requirements
on people trying to get a fresh start," adds Ralph Mabey,
co-chair of the legislation committee for the National Bankruptcy
Conference, a national collective of bankruptcy experts that opposes
the legislation.
Medical debtors, as the Health Affairs study shows, are suffering
real hardship, which makes it hard to believe they are simply
shirking their obligations and freeloading off the system, as
Republican rhetoric suggests. In the two years before filing,
22 percent of families in the study went without food, 30 percent
had a utility shut off, 61 percent went without important medical
care and half failed to fill a doctor's prescription.
"The bill is written against a template that everyone has
overspent, including those with breast cancer, those fighting
chronic illness, those who have lost children to cystic fibrosis
or other terrible illnesses," says Warren. "It's like
responding to a cholera outbreak by closing down the hospitals."
Whatever happens politically, the fate of medical debtors will
also be shaped by several cases now winding through the courts.
Last summer, law firms filed numerous lawsuits against nonprofit
hospitals for overcharging uninsured patients, a practice that
often contributes to bankruptcy. Attorney Richard Scruggs, who
headed government lawsuits against big tobacco companies, is leading
the federal effort.
On the state level, a class-action suit is pending in Illinois
that involves Advocate, the source of Rose Shaffer's troubles.
In November 2003 seven former patients filed the suit, charging
Advocate with imposing discriminatory pricing (the number has
since risen to seventeen). There is ample evidence for their claims.
In March 2003 the Service Employees International Union, the nation's
largest healthcare union and an adversary of Advocate in organizing
campaigns, released a study on the collection practices of fifty-nine
Cook County hospitals. Advocate, which operates six hospitals
in the county, ranked worst. According to SEIU, Advocate charged
uninsured patients 139 percent more than their insured counterparts
and was three times as likely to sue as other local hospitals.
A month after the report's release, Advocate announced an increase
in charity care for patients who couldn't pay. But for Rose Shaffer
and others, it was too late. Later that year SEIU and Barack Obama
brought Shaffer to Springfield to tell her story to the State
Assembly.
"Advocate fails to provide automatic charity care discounts
to the poor, and as a result the uninsured are still victimized
by aggressive pricing and collections tactics," says Joseph
Geevarghese, director of SEIU's Hospital Accountability Project.
Advocate, which says it offers among the nation's most generous
charity care, filed a motion to dismiss and a counterclaim against
SEIU, accusing the union of defamation. The motion was denied
last November, but Advocate plans on refiling. The lawsuit will
likely be tried this year.
Still, University of North Carolina associate law professor Melissa
Jacoby, who testified before Congress last summer on how hospital
collection practices can cause bankruptcy, doesn't think litigation
on its own will right the system. "Hospitals with the most
egregious practices certainly should clean up their acts,"
she says, "but millions of people will still experience medical-related
financial problems and their consequences, including debt collection
and bankruptcy."
Jay Westbrook, a University of Texas law professor who co-wrote
the 1981 bankruptcy study, believes bankruptcy patterns are an
indicator of other social problems--high unemployment, rising
divorce rates (people often file for bankruptcy after a divorce)
and, in this case, a crumbling healthcare system. "Bankruptcy
occurs when there is a crisis. That's what it's there for,"
Westbrook says.
A study by the Center for Studying Health System Change shows
that 20 million families struggled with medical debt in 2003.
Federal projections suggest that out-of-pocket health expenses
will rise at least until 2013. Elizabeth Warren and Steffie Woolhandler
foresee medical bankruptcies continuing to climb as the uninsured
population swells, overburdened hospitals aggressively collect
to meet the bottom line, prescription drug prices increase and
employers shift medical costs to employees.
The only real cure for the medical bankruptcy epidemic, according
to Physicians for a National Health Program, is national health
insurance--a system where coverage isn't linked to employment
and medically necessary care is accessible to all without deductibles
or copayments. If such sweeping reform seems a long way off, there
are short-term fixes too. One would be to exempt medical debtors
from any new laws restricting bankruptcies. "The bankruptcy
courthouse doors must stay open for those who really need it,"
says Warren. Another worthwhile improvement, notes Henry Sommer,
president of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys,
would be to better protect the homes of medical debtors; many
states allow people only a small amount of home equity after they've
gone bankrupt.
But even modest measures to protect medical debtors face an increasingly
unforgiving environment. Although the recent litigation will likely
force some hospitals to rethink collection practices, there's
evidence they are finding other ways to reclaim money, like pushing
debtors toward lenders and hospital-sponsored credit cards. And
the bankruptcy reform pending in Congress could hurl many more
middle-class Americans into lifelong debt.
Rose Shaffer, for one, is still reeling. She works two nursing
jobs, seven days a week for nearly sixty hours, so she can make
the monthly $2,088 in Chapter 13 payments she still owes. Advocate
has yet to claim its portion, but Shaffer's credit is severely
damaged and will be for the next decade. She's praying her eleven-year-old
car will make it through the Chicago winter.
"Sometimes I would start crying. I wished I was dead, but
I was too big a coward to kill myself," Shaffer says. "I
never thought my life would end up like this."